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One particular concern of the 2010 Winter Conference on Animal Learning and Behaviour was the 
degree to which the behaviours of human and nonhuman animals might be interpreted as the result of 
the same cognitive mechanisms. Here, we examine three examples in rats (causal-reasoning, 
sensitivity to the absence of stimuli, and the relationship between effort and reward) where higher-
order mental processes might be invoked as explanations of the observed behaviour. In each case we 
argue that alternative accounts, based on “lower” mental processes, are also consistent with the 
observed data. On the basis of the principle of parsimony, enshrined as a grounding assumption of 
comparative psychology in C. Lloyd Morgan’s Canon, the existence of such alternative accounts 
means that the available evidence does not licence the conclusion that non-human animals display 
evidence of human-like cognitive processes in these areas.
A central concern for anyone interested in the mental life of nonhuman 
animals is the degree to which the behaviours of human and nonhuman animals are 
underpinned by the same cognitive mechanisms. The focus session for the 2010 
Winter Conference of Animal Learning and Behavior (WCALB), and this special 
issue, “The Interface between Learning and Cognition,” was directed at 
investigating this very concern. Within artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and 
psychology, a dominant assumption has been that nonhuman animals are 
convenient systems in which to study simple processes (e.g., of learning and 
memory) untrammelled by the more complex reasoning and rule-based processes 
possessed by humans. That is, nonhuman animals are basically complex automata -
albeit ones that often exhibit a remarkable degree of flexibility. However, this 
assumption is not universal (especially if the field of comparative psychology is 
broadly conceived) and intriguing recent research suggests that animals might, in 
addition to simpler associative processes, also have far richer ways of representing 
the texture of their environment than has hitherto been supposed (e.g., Blaisdell, 
Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Foote & Crystal, 2007; Murphy, Mondragon, 
& Murphy, 2008). 
Although initial assumptions regarding the issue of whether nonhuman 
animals exhibit evidence of complex cognitive mechanisms differ greatly, the field 
of comparative psychology does share a common intellectual heritage. In 
particular, Morgan’s Canon, “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome 
of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise 
of one that stands lower in the psychological scale” (Morgan, 1894, p. 53), 
represents the fact that due consideration of parsimony is central to the 
investigation and interpretation of animal behaviour. The idea that animals might 
be capable of engaging in complex cognition certainly raises the suggestion that 
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their actions might be the outcome of particularly high psychical facilities. 
Therefore this paper will consider three examples of behaviour in rats, which were 
discussed at the 2010 WCALB in terms of complex cognitive mechanisms, to ask 
whether simpler mechanisms can indeed be ruled out as accounts of these 
behaviours and thus to examine whether Morgan’s Canon has been satisfied. 
Causal Reasoning in Rats
One long tradition of research has sought to investigate the capabilities of 
a variety of species (in particular birds and non-human primates) with respect to 
causal reasoning via tests of their ability to understand cause-effect relations in tool 
use (e.g., Fujita, Kuroshima, & Asai, 2003; Martin-Ordas, Call, & Colmenares, 
2008; Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, Tsao, & Hauser, 2006; Tebbich & Bshary, 2004; 
Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). Unfortunately this research is currently 
inconclusive because the results have been somewhat inconsistent. Moreover, in 
many cases behaviours consistent with true understanding of cause-effect 
relationships was also consistent with learning by trial and error. The development 
by Blaisdell et al. (2006) of a novel technique for assessing the capacity for causal 
reasoning in rats, using a very basic behavioural repertoire, was a major advance 
from such inconclusive studies based on behaviourally complex tasks. Their task 
was developed from an analysis of causal model theory (for a review, see 
Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006) and was effectively a rat-based version 
of the type of reasoning task used in humans by Waldmann and Hagmayer (2005). 
An evocative example will serve to illustrate the nature of the technique 
developed by Blaisdell et al. (2006). When a single cause (e.g., raindrops) can have 
two separate effects (wet windows and clothes on a washing line becoming damp), 
the observation of one effect (wet windows) can lead to the inference that the other 
effect (damp clothes) has also occurred (this example is taken from Clayton & 
Dickinson, 2006). Causal model theory suggests that this inference reflects the 
assumption that the observed effect (wet windows) must be the result of its usual 
cause (rain), which should also result in its second effect (damp clothes). However, 
if there is an alternative cause for the first effect (e.g., a water sprinkler near the 
window, but far from the washing) then the presence of the normal cause (rain) 
cannot be inferred and thus the other effects of rain are not presumed to occur 
either. It is this sensitivity to the difference between simply observing an effect and 
that effect having an alternative cause which Blaisdell et al. (2006) have recently 
studied in rats (see also, Leising, Wong, Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008). 
In one experiment, training was given in which a visual stimulus (A:
analogous to raindrops) served as the "common cause" for two separate effects: an 
auditory stimulus, B (wet window), and the delivery of sucrose into a food well 
(damp clothes). This common cause treatment was arranged by giving rats separate 
AB and Asucrose trials. On further control trials, the rats received another 
auditory stimulus C (the “direct-cause”) that was presented simultaneously with 
sucrose (i.e., C+sucrose trials). During subsequent testing, the tendency of rats to 
approach the food well (“nosepoking”; analogous to removing clothes from the 
line) was examined as a function of whether the presentation of B or C was 
contingent upon rats pressing a lever (intervene condition) or simply occurred 
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without apparent cause (observe condition). The rats were less likely to nosepoke if
their lever presses resulted in the presentation of B than if B arrived unannounced, 
but there was no influence of the intervene/observe manipulation on nosepoking 
during C. This pattern of responding is clearly consistent with causal model theory, 
and so Blaisdell et al. (2006) concluded that the rats were engaging in causal 
inference because they could not identify a simpler account of the behaviours 
observed.
Clearly, the process by which Blaisdell et al. (2006) reached the conclusion 
that rats are engaging in a process of causal reasoning fits the form of Morgan’s 
Canon: a complex cognitive account was only accepted once simpler accounts 
were considered and rejected. The question thus becomes whether the rejection of 
simpler accounts was warranted on the basis of the observed behaviours. We have 
previously argued that it was not (Dwyer, Starns, & Honey, 2009). This argument 
was based on a consideration of the ergonomics of the behavioural task presented 
to the rats: the alternative cause of the auditory stimulus was a lever press, a 
manipulandum that was separated from the food magazine, and so any tendency to 
interact with the lever would interfere with any tendency to interact with the food 
magazine. That is, competition between responses could have contributed to the 
lower levels of magazine responding during the auditory stimulus when it occurred 
as a consequence of a rat’s own actions. If correct, this very simple account 
suggests that, across — but not necessarily within — experimental conditions,
there should be a reciprocal relationship between the tendency to press the lever 
and the tendency to enter the food magazine during the auditory stimulus. It should 
be stressed that, in order for response competition to explain differences between 
conditions in the levels of nosepoking it is response levels across conditions that 
should be reciprocal: the relationship between responses within an experimental 
condition might simply reflect individual differences in overall activity or the 
tendency to interact with environmental stimuli generally. The original data do not 
speak to the possibility of response competition because lever press responses were 
not recorded (for all conditions) as a function of whether they occurred during the 
auditory stimuli. Therefore we (Dwyer, Starns et al., 2009) repeated the procedures 
used by Blaisdell et al. (2006) while recording lever press responses in a manner 
that allowed a direct test of response competition. In short, a reciprocal relationship 
was found across experimental conditions whereby food magazine responding was 
low when lever pressing was high during the critical auditory stimuli. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to replicate the theoretically vital interaction from 
the original study whereby the presentation of the auditory stimulus as a 
consequence of the rats’ own actions only interfered with magazine responding in 
the common-cause conditions (but see Leising et al., 2008). Thus, while there is 
direct evidence that lever press and food-magazine responses compete with each 
other in this type of study (and so the idea that response competition might 
contribute to the observed behaviour is plausible) we know of no existing 
experiment where this possibility can be directly tested as an account of the 
interaction between the effects of the manipulation of training condition (common-
cause versus direct cause or causal-chain) and the test condition (observe versus 
intervene) that is purported to uniquely reflect the operation of causal reasoning. 
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It should be noted that the existence of competition between lever press 
and magazine responses does not, in itself, directly invalidate the claim that rats 
might be capable of causal reasoning. To return to the human example discussed 
above, the fact that someone could not both turn on a sprinkler at the front of their 
house and remove the washing at the back at the same time does not mean that they 
do not understand that there is no need to bring in the washing because it is the 
sprinkler is wetting the windows and not rain. It is invoking the principle of 
parsimony instantiated in Morgan’s Canon which encourages the acceptance of the 
simpler account of the rats’ behaviour. We would also note that, although we have 
only considered one potential alternative explanation of the behaviour in the 
current tasks, other accounts may exist. In particular, new tests of an existing 
associative model of learning (Schmajuk, Lam, & Gray, 1996) suggest that this 
model can, without post-hoc modification of its basic structure, be used to provide 
simulations of the data considered here (Kutlu & Schmajuk, in press). At the time 
of writing the final report of these new simulations was not publicly available, and 
so detailed consideration of them is not appropriate here. However, the model 
under consideration (Schmajuk et al., 1996) instantiates a number of associative 
mechanisms and its predictions can only be discovered by extensive simulation. 
That is, while the model is certainly “simple” in that it does not include any 
contribution of higher cognitive processes, the combination of multiple 
mechanisms means that it is computationally quite complex. The computational 
complexity of the Schmajuk et al. (1996) brings into sharp relief the potential 
tension between different conceptions of parsimony in relation to mental processes 
and raises the question of whether or not a small number of higher-order mental 
processes is more complex than a large number of lower-order processes. We will 
return to this issue later. Regardless, the fact that a purely mechanistic model based 
on well-established associative principles can mimic data that have been claimed to 
be uniquely consistent with causal reasoning offers at the very least an existence 
proof for another account of this data that will require consideration according to 
Morgan’s Canon. 
Patterning and Informative Absence
Although somewhat separate from that main focus of the study, the 
supplementary materials for Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) experiments contained a brief 
note regarding a serendipitous observation on performance in one of the control 
conditions. That is, in a condition referred to as “causal-chain,” animals were 
exposed to events such that an auditory cue predicted a light, and that in turn the 
light predicted food. Such treatment is often referred to as sensory preconditioning 
(e.g., Rescorla, 1980; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972) and typically results in the 
observation that animals will make responses appropriate to the anticipation of the 
reinforcer (e.g., entering the magazine) when presented with the auditory cue, even 
though it has itself never been directly paired with the reinforcer. In this case, 
however, animals did not initially make magazine responses when presented with 
the auditory cue alone, but in subsequent experiments, where the stimulus light was 
removed from the experimental chamber prior to test, they did. Blaisdell and his 
colleagues (Blaisdell, Leising, Stahlman, & Waldmann, 2009) suggested that the 
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difference between the unsuccessful pilot study and the subsequent experiments 
might be directly related to the removal of the light from the chamber because the 
rats had acquired a causal chain whereby the auditory stimulus caused the light and 
the light caused the food and thus the absence of the light would break the causal 
chain. Blaisdell et al. (2009) provided further evidence consistent with the idea that 
removing the light prior to test would increase responding to the auditory stimulus 
in the manner suggested by the previous pilot data. In order to explain why 
manipulating access to the light would moderate responding to the tone they 
proposed that the rats were sensitive to the difference between the explicit physical 
absence of an event and the absence of information about it. Furthermore, they 
suggested that, in the absence of access to the physical source of a cue, its presence 
or absence would be considered to be ambiguous and that this ambiguity would 
influence their expectancies regarding the occurrence of other events that had 
previously followed the now-absent cue (although they did note that other accounts 
of the data would be possible). We will return to consider just such an associative 
account later. Beforehand, we will turn to work regarding patterning procedures 
that was inspired by the idea that rats might be sensitive to ambiguity.
Fast and Blaisdell (in press) report two studies examining the effect of 
manipulating the explicit absence of cues on performance following training on 
patterning discriminations (some of these data were presented by Aaron Blaisdell 
as part of his keynote address to the WCALB). In Experiment 1, initial training 
was given in two conditions: either two cues A and B (a solid light on one side of 
the chamber and a flashing light on the other) were presented such that either the 
individual cues predicted reinforcement but the combination of both cues did not 
(“negative pattering”: A+, B+, AB-); or the individual cues did not predict 
reinforcement but the combination did (“positive patterning”: A-, B-, AB+). These 
stimuli were used as discriminative cues indicating when a lever press would be 
reinforced in an instrumental design. Clear discriminative responding was 
observed: rats in the positive patterning conditions responded more to the two 
cues presented together (i.e., AB) than they did to the cues presented alone (A or 
B), while animals in the negative patterning conditions responded more to the cues 
presented alone than to the combination. Following the acquisition of 
discriminative responding, animals’ responses to a single cue (A) were examined 
as a factor of whether the light that represented the other cue (B) was either present 
(but unilluminated) or absent (in this condition the stimulus light was covered). 
That is, in the uncovered test conditions, rats had access to both the illuminated cue 
A and the unilluminated bulb that corresponded to cue B, while in the covered test 
conditions, rats had the same access to cue A but were unable to see the bulb that 
corresponded to cue B, and thus could not have ascertained whether it was 
illuminated or not. Overall, responding to the single cue A was higher in animals
given negative patterning than in those given positive pattering and the difference 
between patterning conditions was reduced when the bulb for cue B was covered. 
The effect of covering the stimulus bulb was due to a reduction in responding in 
the negative pattering animals, while those trained on positive pattering were 
relatively unaffected. 
In Experiment 2 all animals were trained on both positive and negative 
patterning discriminations. One of these was based on the same visual cues as in 
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Experiment 1 while the other was based on auditory stimuli (the nature of the cues 
used for each type of discrimination was counterbalanced across animals). 
Following acquisition, all animals were tested with the visual stimuli as in 
Experiment 1: that is, they were tested for their response to stimulus A alone 
(which had been part of either a negative or a positive pattering discrimination) as 
a factor of whether the stimulus light for B was covered or not. Again, responding 
to the single cue A was higher in the negative patterning than the positive pattering 
conditions, and this difference was attenuated when B was covered. Unlike 
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, covering B influenced both the positive and 
negative patterning cases: that is, in the positive pattering case responding to A 
was higher when B was covered than when it was uncovered, while in the negative 
pattering case responding to A was lower when B was covered than when it was 
uncovered. In line with the theoretical discussion of the sensory preconditioning 
experiments, Fast and Blaisdell (in press) interpreted this pattern of results in light 
of the idea that the rats were behaving as if they had noticed that the second 
stimulus light was not available for inspection, concluded that its status was 
ambiguous, as opposed to simply being not presented, and thus respond in an 
intermediate fashion that reflected both possible states of the absent cue1. 
Moreover, in order to explain why this modulation of responding was not observed 
for the positive pattering case in Experiment 1 it was suggested that the concurrent 
exposure to the negative patterning discrimination might have influenced the 
manner in which either the discrimination was solved. While the suggestion that 
rats were sensitive to ambiguity is certainly consistent with the observed data, 
Morgan’s Canon requires that simpler explanations be considered.
This preceding account of the animals’ behaviour implies, firstly, that the 
status of a cue must be represented at least two potential states, on (e.g., Aon) and 
off (e.g., Aoff), where off corresponds to a light that is present, but unilluminated. 
At first glance, such Aoff representations seem to require that rats would be able to 
explicitly represent the absence of an event. However, it should be remembered 
that the visual stimuli used by Fast and Blaisdell (in press) consisted of the 
illumination of a stimulus light and so the absence of the cue actually corresponds 
to a physically present stimulus — namely the unilluminated bulb. Thus, a 
consideration of CSoff representations does not lead to the absolute requirement 
that rats are capable of representing cues that are not physically present. That said, 
the idea that rats might explicitly represent the absence of an event is relatively 
uncontroversial: it is not uncommon for the absence of an otherwise presented cue 
to be used as a signal in conditioning experiments (for example Hall & Honey, 
1989) used the darkening of a houselight as a cue) and the phenomena of 
representation mediated conditioning demonstrates that physically absent events 
can be represented and support learning (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Dwyer, 2003; 
Holland, 1990). Thus there is little reason to question the idea that rats might 
represent either the non-illumination of a physically present stimulus light or even 
                                                       
1It should be noted that Fast and Blaisdell (in press) are careful to explain that they are not actually 
attributing awareness of the relevant conditions to the rats, merely that their behaviour served the 
function of being sensitive to ambiguity. We will return to this point once we have described an 
associative account of the effects of preventing access to a stimulus.  
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the absence of an otherwise expected stimulus. However, the preceding account 
also suggests that preventing access to the source of a cue (i.e., placing an opaque 
covering over the light bulb) results in the status of the cue being treated as 
ambiguous. But is some representation of “uncertainty” regarding the status of an 
absent cue required to explain the behaviour of the rats on this task? That is, if we 
allow that rats represent both the illumination and non-illumination of the critical 
stimulus lights, then it is possible to examine the effects of including such CSoff
representations on associative accounts of the current patterning designs that do 
not require any consideration of ambiguity. 
In order to do this we utilised the ALTSim program (Thorwart, Schultheis, 
Konig, & Lachnit, 2009) which was developed to provide simulations of common 
associative models. Stimulus representations were created for Aon, Aoff, Bon, and 
Boff and the training procedures modelled such that A trials would involve 
presenting Aon and Boff, B trials comprised Bon and Aoff, compound trials 
comprised Aon and Bon, while inter-trial intervals comprised Aoff and Boff. 
Simulation of positive patterning was performed by pairing compound trials (A 
and B together) with a reinforcer and element (either A or B alone) unreinforced, 
while negative patterning was instantiated by presenting element trials with the 
reinforcer and compound trials without reinforcement. In both cases inter-trial 
intervals (Aoff and Boff together) were presented unreinforced. Training was 
continued until associative strengths approached asymptote. The test phase was 
modelled by comparing the associative strength of Aon and Boff combined 
(uncovered test) with the associative strength of Aon alone (covered test – so 
neither Bon nor Boff were presented). Note that simulating the covered test as 
simply not activating either of the Bon or Boff representations (because the rats 
would have access to neither the illuminated nor the unilluminated stimulus light) 
is not requiring that the status of B is treated as ambiguous, merely that there is no 
relevant stimulation to excite either the representation of its presence or absence. 
Figure 1 (Panels A and B for training, panels C and D for test) shows 
examples of these simulations according to the configural model proposed by 
Pearce (1994) and the, elemental, Rescorla-Wagner model (1972). Inspection of 
Panel A reveals that the addition of CSoff representations does not interfere with 
the ability of Pearce’s (1994) model to account for positive and negative 
patterning. Moreover, Panel B indicates that the addition of such CSoff
representations does not interfere with the ability of the Rescorla-Wagner model 
(1972) to account for positive patterning, but nor does it overcome the failure of 
this model to account for negative patterning. Inspection of Panel C (Pearce’s 
configural model) indicates that activation of the US node by stimulus A was 
greater in the negative than the positive pattering case and that this difference was 
reduced when the contribution of Boff representations was removed to simulate the 
covering of the light for stimulus B.  That is exactly the pattern of results as 
obtained in Experiment 2, and the negative pattering case from Experiment 1, of 
Fast and Blaisdell (in press). Panel D indicates that the inclusion or exclusion of 
Boff representations has little effect on the predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner 
model regarding responding to cue A. That is the pattern of results from the 
positive pattering condition from Experiment 1 of Fast and Blaisdell (in press). 
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Figure 1. Shows simulations of Pearce’s (1994) configural theory and the (elemental) Rescorla-
Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Panels A (Pearce) and B (Rescorla-Wagner) show the 
simulation of positive (i.e., A-, B-, AB+) and negative (A+, B+, AB-) pattering. Panels C (Pearce) 
and D (Rescorla-Wagner) show the simulation of the test phase with cue A as a factor of whether the 
stimulus light for B was covered or uncovered. As noted in the text, these simulations assume the 
existence of cues for Aon, Aoff, Bon, and Boff. For the training simulations, AB reflects the activation 
of cues Aon and Bon, while A reflects the activation of cues Aon and Boff, and B was simulated as Bon
and Aoff. For the test simulations, uncovered reflects the activation of cues Aon and Boff (i.e. the 
condition where stimulus A was presented and the light corresponding to stimulus B was present but 
unilluminated) and covered by activation of Aon alone (i.e. the condition where stimulus A was 
presented and an opaque cover was placed over the light corresponding to stimulus B thus preventing 
access to that stimulus — that is, covering is implemented in the simulation by removing the Boff
representation).
To summarise, if it is assumed that the non-illumination of a stimulus light 
is represented by animals, then, for Pearce’s configural model (1994), the 
representations of such absences will contribute to the learning of a patterning 
discrimination. Moreover, the removal of such absence cues (by preventing access 
to the unilluminated light) will result in a disruption of performance because these, 
once predictive, cues are not able to contribute. In contrast, the elemental Rescorla-
Wagner model (1972) is largely unaffected by the inclusion of CSoff cues. It should 
be noted that the simulations presented in Figure 1 reflects the default alpha values 
for the ALTSim program. Although no effort was made to optimise the simulation 
by the systematic manipulation of parameters, reducing the salience of the CSoff
representations relative the CSon representations makes little difference to the 
overall pattern of results. In addition, this pattern of results is not unique to the 
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models described here. Simulations of other models covered by ALTSim (Harris, 
2006; Wagner, 2003) produce the same general pattern of results as Pearce’s 
model. Indeed, if it is assumed that there are unique cues corresponding to the 
combination of two or more elements (Whitlow & Wagner, 1972) then the 
simulations of the Rescorla-Wagner model also correspond to the general pattern 
for Pearce’s model. That is, any model tested here that can account for negative 
patterning will also be sensitive to the removal of CSoff cues. 
In short, if it is assumed that the performance of animals exposed to a 
negative patterning discrimination is controlled by configural processes, while 
those only exposed to positive patterning is controlled by elemental learning 
mechanisms, then standard associative theories provide a perfect fit to the observed 
effects of preventing access to a cue during testing following training on patterning 
discriminations simply by considering the signal value of an unilluminated bulb. 
Thus there is no need to posit an additional process whereby the inability to access 
the source of a cue results in the status of that cue being treated as ambiguous. One 
might object that the assumption of different learning mechanisms for positive and 
negative patterning is entirely post-hoc. However, the same assumption was made 
by Fast and Blaisdell (in press), and this assumption is entirely consistent with the 
fact that positive patterning is typically acquired more readily than negative 
patterning (for recent demonstrations see, Harris, Gharaei, & Moore, 2009; Harris, 
Livesey, Gharaei, & Westbrook, 2008). Moreover, a consideration of CSoff cues 
can also provide an account of the sensory preconditioning experiments which 
instigated this line of research (Blaisdell et al., 2009). Consider that in those 
experiments A was paired with B before B was paired with food. As the B-food 
training was given across multiple trials, separated by intervals of between 2-6 
minutes, there would have been the opportunity to learn an inhibitory relationship 
whereby Boff predicts the absence of food. Covering the stimulus light 
corresponding to B during test would mean that the Boff representation would 
remain inactivated and remove its inhibitory effects. 
Although studies of patterning and sensory preconditioning have shown 
that rats are sensitive to the difference between a light being unilluminated and the 
covering of that stimulus bulb, the behaviour in these tests can be explained in 
terms of standard associative theory. To appropriate a phrase used judiciously by 
Fast and Blaisdell (in press) it is “as if” associative models are sensitive to the 
ambiguity created by the covering of a stimulus light. Obviously, these models are 
not actually sensitive to ambiguity as their behaviour is entirely specified by the 
formation of associative links between the stimulus representations it is furnished 
with. Entirely deterministic systems that have no way of representing or 
appreciating ambiguity produce outcomes that are functionally equivalent to that 
which might be produced by agents that were genuinely aware of ambiguity. Thus 
the functional outcome of behaviour is no guide to the mechanisms involved in its 
production. To take a florid example, one might describe a street magician with a 
set of marked cards as behaving “as if” they can read the minds of their audience, 
but this is hardly a proof of the existence of magic! Of course, there are many good 
reasons to pursue a functional analysis in a variety of situations (for a discussion of 
this issue in the context of rationality more broadly see Kacelnik, 2006) but 
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Morgan’s Canon is explicitly concerned with the mechanisms by which a 
particular behaviour is produced rather than with its functional outcome. 
Effort and Reward Value
We now move to an example, from our own work, of a pattern of 
behaviour that might seem to reflect the operation of complex, human-like, 
cognitive capacities. The value of a liquid reward can be assessed in rats by the 
examination of palatability via the microstructural analysis of licking during 
ingestion. Rats rarely show continuous consumption of a liquid. Instead they 
perform repeated clusters of licks separated by pauses. The mean number of licks 
per cluster has a positive, monotonic relationship with the concentration of a 
palatable solution such as sucrose (Davis & Smith, 1992; Spector, Klumpp, & 
Kaplan, 1998). Cluster size has also been found to have a negative monotonic 
relationship with the concentration of an unpalatable solution such as quinine 
(Hsiao & Fan, 1993; Spector & St. John, 1998). These findings have led to the idea 
that cluster size may be a useful measure of reinforcer palatability and hence, 
reward value. We have previously used this technique in a number of appetitive 
and aversive conditioning procedures (e.g., Dwyer, 2008, 2009; Dwyer, Boakes, & 
Hayward, 2008; Dwyer, Pincham, Thein, & Harris, 2009) but neither we, nor 
anyone else, had applied it in the context of instrumental behaviours. In the 
preliminary stages of a pilot experiment aimed at developing procedures in which 
rats would reliably press a lever to gain access to a sucrose solution, at the same 
time as their hedonic response to the sucrose reward could be measured, rats 
received exposure to increasing response requirements. Interestingly, it was 
observed that the size of lick clusters during ingestion of the sucrose reinforcer 
increased as the response requirement was raised. This increase in cluster size 
might be reflective of an effect whereby the more effort rats expended to obtain the 
reinforcer, the greater its perceived palatability. We (Lydall, Gilmour, & Dwyer, 
2010) investigated this possibility by examining the value of the sucrose reward 
(using lick cluster size as an indicator of hedonic value) as a function of whether 
the rats were required to press a lever 50 times (high effort) to receive a sucrose 
reinforcer or whether they pressed a lever only 10 times (low effort). The effort 
involved in the lever press response requirement has two obvious components:
work and waiting time, because it takes more work and more time to press a lever 
50 times than 10. Therefore, that study also investigated the possibility that 
differences in the intervals between reinforcers in low and high ratio schedules 
may account for these changes in reward palatability using a procedure in which 
rats either worked (master conditions), or just waited to be rewarded (yoked 
conditions where the reinforcer occurred at times matched to those earned in the 
master conditions). The results indicated that rats perceived the sucrose reinforcer 
as more palatable when they pressed the lever 50 times than when they pressed 10 
times. Although there was also a difference in the yoked conditions, this was 
smaller than in the master conditions, indicating that effort genuinely influenced 
the hedonic response to the reward. 
This effect bears striking resemblance to the human phenomenon of 
‘Effort Justification,’ in which greater value is placed on rewards that are harder to 
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obtain. According to Festinger (1957), this tendency can be attributed to cognitive 
dissonance: a state of psychological discomfort that occurs when there is a 
discrepancy between a person’s attitude and their actions. In such circumstances, 
humans may try to reduce this dissonance by modifying their attitudes to 
complement their behaviour. In a classic study by Aronson and Mills (1959), 
young women underwent ‘severe’ or ‘mild’ initiation to join a discussion group. 
Participants in the severe initiation condition were asked to read aloud a sexually 
explicit passage, whereas those in the mild initiation group were given much less 
embarrassing material to read. When asked to rate the discussion group, the severe 
initiation group's ratings were significantly higher than those of the mild initiation 
group. That is, manipulating the effort required to join the group changed the 
participants’ perceived value of the outcome of their behaviour. Aronson and Mills 
suggested that the group whose initiation process was more difficult increased 
their valuation of the discussion group to resolve the dissonant relationship 
produced by undergoing severe embarrassment in order to join a discussion group 
of little value.
Our results demonstrated that the value of a reward was indeed higher 
when it followed high rather than low effort, and such an effort justification effect 
in humans would likely be attributed to mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance. 
Indeed, the suggestion that cognitive dissonance might explain aspects of animal 
behaviour was championed by Lawrence and Festinger (1962). While the 
behavioural data they considered can be explained in far simpler terms 
(Mackintosh, 1974), this critique (largely focused on the fact that resistance to 
extinction is not positively related to the value of the reinforcer used in training) 
does not apply to our data. Therefore the analysis of effort effects in terms of 
cognitive dissonance offered by Lawrence and Festinger (1962) remains viable.  
But are there other explanations that might be offered that do not require rats to be 
subject to cognitive dissonance?
In an experiment by Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (2000), pigeons 
were required to peck a white light either once or twenty times to receive one of 
two different simultaneous colour discrimination problems. Pecks on the correct 
colour of each discrimination (S+) were rewarded with food. Following training, 
when pigeons were given a choice between the two positive (S+) colours, they 
showed a preference for the colour that followed the greatest effort during training. 
Clement et al. (2000) argued that their results could be attributed to ‘within-trial 
contrast.’ This account suggests that the value of a positive stimulus is judged 
relative to the motivational state of the animal prior to its presentation. A twenty-
peck response requirement is presumably more aversive than a single peck 
requirement. Therefore the appearance of the S+ that normally follows twenty 
pecks may be a relatively greater improvement in conditions (a greater contrast) 
than the appearance of the S+ that normally follows one peck. In this way, a 
preference may develop for the outcome that follows higher effort. The 
experiment by Clement et al. is not a direct replication of the human effort 
justification effect, since the value of the reinforcer itself (the food reward) was 
not measured. However, the theoretical interpretation offered for their findings is 
interesting, especially as we have recently demonstrated that other forms of 
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contrast can produce changes in our lick-cluster measure of reward value (Dwyer, 
Lydall, & Hayward, 2011). 
If it is assumed that high effort is more aversive than low effort then 
within-trial contrast provides a simple account of the current data. Moreover, if it 
is assumed that waiting a long time for reward is more aversive than waiting for a 
short time, the contrast account provides an explanation for the data in the yoked 
conditions as well. However, a consideration of the effects of the interval between 
reinforcers might offer an even simpler explanation. Each access to sucrose will 
lead to an adaptation of the relevant receptors, and our studies of simultaneous 
contrast demonstrate that adaptation will reduce the response to a given sucrose 
concentration (Dwyer et al., 2011). As recovery from adaptation will be larger 
with longer intervals, then such adaptation effects provide a direct account of the 
pattern of behaviour observed in the yoked conditions. Indeed, it is possible to 
extend this adaptation account to the high versus low effort comparison if lever 
pressing speeds recovery from adaptation. Nothing in the experiments considered 
above allows for a principled decision between the accounts in terms of contrast or 
adaptation but both of these accounts rest on far simpler mechanisms than those 
assumed by cognitive dissonance. Thus, although our results (Lydall et al., 2010)
and those of others (e.g., Clement et al., 2000) might appear on the surface to 
support Lawrence and Festinger’s (1962) contention that cognitive dissonance 
contributes to the behaviour on non-human animals the existence of simpler 
accounts for that behaviour renders this interpretation unnecessary. 
What is “Simple”?
At times in the preceding discussions we have considered models of 
associative learning that are, to a greater or lesser degree, computationally complex 
enough that deriving predictions from them requires a process of computer-based 
simulation. This was most striking when comparing the causal model theory 
account of Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) experiments with simulations of the Schmajuk 
et al. (1996) model:  the predictions of causal model theory can be derived easily 
and directly from the theoretical account itself, while the Schmajuk et al. (1996)
model requires detailed simulation to derive its predictions. Thus, although an 
account in terms of causal reasoning requires accepting that rats are capable of 
higher-order mental processes, it is (computationally at least) simpler than an 
account in terms of lower-order (associative/mechanistic) processes. As such, two 
different conceptions of simplicity appear to be in tension here: Morgan’s Canon 
explicitly favours accepting the explanation in terms of the lowest form of mental 
process, while a broader conception of parsimony (as encapsulated by Occam’s 
Razor) would favour the explanation that requires the lower number of postulated 
processes regardless of whether they correspond to higher or lower-order mental 
processes. 
Morgan (1894) himself scathingly dismissed the idea that apparently 
simpler explanations might be preferable without a consideration of the level of 
mental process involved: 
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Is it not simpler to explain the higher activities of animals as the direct 
outcome of reason or intellectual thought? … It is the apparent simplicity 
of the explanation that leads many people to naively adopt it. But surely 
the simplicity of an explanation is no necessary criterion of its truth. The 
explanation of the genesis of the organic world by direct creative fiat is far 
simpler than the explanation of its genesis through the indirect method of 
evolution. (p. 54)
Critically, attributing human-like levels of mental processes to animals 
only allows for superficially simpler accounts of their behaviour. The vast
literature on, for example, reasoning and inference in humans is eloquent 
testimony to the fact that explaining the cognitive processes underpinning such 
terms is incredibly complex in its own right. In short, the apparent contrast 
between Morgan’s Canon, with its emphasis on the level of mental processes, and 
more general conceptions of parsimony rests, at least here, on a 
mischaracterisation of higher mental processes as “simple” conceptually. In the 
present case, the “higher-order” processes being considered such as causal 
reasoning themselves require further explanation before they can truly be said to be 
understood, whereas the “lower” associative level processes can be described in 
purely mechanistic terms, and thus do not require further explanation (the details 
of their biological instantiation aside). This is not to say that describing behaviour 
in terms of higher-order mental processes is invalid or incorrect, merely that the 
conceptual complexity of these processes should not be ignored.   
Summary and Conclusions
We have considered three areas, causal-reasoning, sensitivity to the 
absence of stimuli, and the relationship between effort and reward, where higher-
order mental processes might be invoked as explanations for the behaviour of rats. 
We have deliberately not explored whether any of the higher-order accounts are 
directly inconsistent with the observed data (although this is not to say that these 
accounts cannot, or should not, be tested in such a fashion) because it is our 
intention to highlight the principle enshrined in Morgan’s Canon; namely that 
accounts of animal behaviour in terms of higher-order mental functions should 
only be accepted when explanations in terms of simpler mechanisms are 
unavailable. That is, accepting Morgan’s Canon places the onus of proof on those 
that would challenge the adequacy of conceptually simple accounts of non-human 
behaviour. In each of the cases considered here we have discussed alternative 
accounts of those behaviours that did not rely on such higher-order processes and 
argued that these simpler mechanisms are consistent with the observed data. 
Therefore, if Morgan’s Canon still represents a grounding assumption for 
comparative psychology, the lesson in all cases is the same: despite surface 
appearances, none of the evidence we have discussed here supports the conclusion 
that the mental capacities of rats include higher-order rational processes.
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